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Abstract 
 
There has been a fundamental shift in school governance in England, triggered by the 
rapid expansion of academies since 2010, which means nearly half the pupils in state-
maintained schools no longer have a governing body as the legal decision making forum 
for their school.  Instead, schools becoming academies have been formed into 
companies, limited by guarantee, working in a direct relationship with central 
government.  Furthermore, the majority of academies are now in multi-academy trusts 
(MATs) which are multi-school organisations with one board of trustees.  School 
governors typically now only have delegated tasks and responsibilities, with 
accountability having now been transferred to the trust which runs the MAT.  The 
research reported here is drawn from interviews conducted with senior executives of 
MATs during the calendar years of 2017 and 2018.  A key part of each interview was to 
examine the way in which governors were contributing across the trust.  The data 
generally demonstrated schemes of delegation that allow individual schools to continue 
to have governance at the institutional level, albeit without the previous legitimatised 
power and accountability.  The investigation did reveal some alarming aspects of school 
governance within trusts, however, which have the potential to allow behaviour that is 
illegitimate or immoral. 
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Introduction 
Until the policy shift towards academies following the 2010 general election each English 
state-maintained schools had their own governing body which was the legal decision 
making forum for the organisation.  The composition of that body was normally between 
nine and 19 members, according to pupil numbers, and included representatives of the 
local authority nominees and officers, together with elected parents and teachers.   The 
headteacher was part of the board (sometimes with full voting rights) which normally 
was serviced by a local authority officer acting as clerk.  The articles and instruments of 
governance were defined by the 1986 Education Act (No. 2) and were considered to be 
part of the “complex system of checks and balances inherent in the administration of 
public services that reflect the ability of English society to prevent fraud and misuse of 
resources” (Male, 2006: 99).   From 1986 each state-maintained school in England was 
thus required to have its own governing body which demonstrated a balance between 
local government, parents and the teacher workforce in a time when education was seen 
as a national system, delivered locally.   
 
School governance was not separated from a more global approach to governance that 
manifested itself during the 1970s and 1980s, a political and economic movement which 
is generally referred to as ‘neoliberalism’ which oversaw the rise of market forces as the 
driving factor for decision making at national and local levels (Connell, 2013).  The 
concept is highly contested and has many claimed origins, but was most enthusiastically 
endorsed during the 1980s by political leaders from the western world seeking a more 
liberal approach to the economy, notably Margaret Thatcher, UK Prime Minister from 
1979-90.   This period, suggest Courtney, McGinity and Gunter (2017: 3) was 
characterised “by increased private-sector involvement in formerly public services; by 
the fetishisation of the market as a mechanism for regulating social and economic 
relations; and by the privileging of private-sector knowledge over professional 
knowledge”. 
 
School governing bodies created by the 1986 Act were not immune to these influences, 
as illustrated by Wilkins and Gobby (forthcoming) who provide two formulations of 
governance: instrumental-rational and agonistic-political.  The first is a technical 
approach, which sees governing bodies established as a means to ensure certain 
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strategic and operational priorities are set and overseen to enhance the quality and 
standards of schools; the second is more political approach, designed to provide 
responsiveness to contextual situations and local autonomy.  The conclusion to be 
drawn is that school governing bodies were encouraged to move away from apolitical to 
political activity during the Thatcher years, ostensibly to improve outcomes.  In other 
words, school governing bodies were to be part of the neoliberal landscape that was 
emerging for public services. 
 
The discussion that follows firstly reports a further shift in central government policy in 
England since 2010 which encouraged even greater independence and autonomy of 
state maintained schools.  It then goes on to explore what has happened to school 
governance in practice for nearly half the school population of English state-maintained 
schools through the academisation process and concludes with an exploration of the 
implications, consequences and possible ramifications of this change. 
 
Radical change to the English maintained school system 
A desire to change the balance between central and local government control of 
education has been encouraged by successive state policies which have been 
promoting school autonomy since the 1988 Education Reform Act (ERA) which, inter-
alia, provided almost complete financial devolution.  This process has been seemingly 
underwritten by the political dogma of what Ball (2018: 220) describes as “a market 
system of education or what we might call neoliberal education […] driven by a factory-
based model of performance management […] predominantly defined publicly and 
politically by concerns about underperformance”.  This inexorable pressure culminated 
in a desire from central government, and especially from Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher in the 1980s, to suppress local democratic control of public funding and 
enhance decision making at the point of contact with the consumer (Male, forthcoming).  
This was part of a wider process of the ‘hollowing-out’ of the state whereby government 
should be small and “concerned with guiding and ensuring services rather than 
necessarily directly providing them and that markets and business should be involved 
in the provision of public policy” (Skelcher, 2000, p.7).  In terms of change this process 
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led to a significant reduction in the power of local authorities, the prior conduit for central 
government policy enactment, to influence and manage practice at the school level. 
 
The original establishment of a state-maintained school system in England was 
contained in the 1902 Education Act which gave responsibility for the school system to 
local councils who quickly established Local Education Authorities (LEAs) as a discreet 
agency within local government.  In 2010, however, a government order redeemed the 
1996 Education Act and removed the word ‘education’ from the title of LEA and required 
local authorities (LAs) to establish children’s services.  At the time of writing there are 
still 152 LAs overseeing state-maintained schools, although their role has changed 
significantly since ERA to become one that is largely scrutiny and support rather than 
control.   
 
Attempts to transform the governance and management of maintained schools following 
the initial impact of ERA were exacerbated by the New Labour government of 1997 
which sought to amplify a previous Conservative government initiative of City 
Technology Colleges, supported directly by business and commercial interests, into the 
creation of a series of ‘Academies’ which had independence from the local authority and 
direct accountability to the Secretary of State for Education.   The Learning and Skills 
Act 2002 created the concept of City Academies, with three opening in that year.  A 
further Education Act in 2002 allowed the word ‘City’ to be removed to allow schools in 
other areas to join the programme and by 2006 there were 46 academies, including 
some previous CTCs which had converted.  Allegedly these academies were 
established to support education in underperforming areas of the country and enjoyed 
a substantial investment in terms of new buildings and enhanced resources.  Another 
feature of the first set of academies was a requirement for a privately funded sponsor to 
be a key partner in a trust which had a legally binding contract agreement with the state, 
the Funding Agreement, which governed the way in which the academy was to operate. 
 
At the time academies were a new feature in the English school system as they were 
established as charitable companies.  Previously the only type of state maintained 
school that existed outside of the local authority structure were Grant Maintained 
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Schools (GMS) which were a feature of ERA.  GMS had a direct relationship to central 
government and were funded directly by the DfE, rather than receiving their devolved 
funding through the LEA, as was the case schools operating under LMS governance 
and regulations.  All state maintained schools were still required to have a governing 
body, but the establishment of academies changed the governance regulations for those 
schools.  Now the structure was for the school to correspond to legislation relating to all 
companies in the UK which needs both an enabling power in its constitution and 
approval of shareholders.  The key difference with a charitable company is that is limited 
by guarantees, rather than shares, and are non-profit organisations which can receive 
additional support from personal or corporate sponsors, either financially or in kind.  
Each academy was to governed by the Academy Agreement it made with the DfE.   It 
should be noted, however, this was not the privatisation of state education, but rather 
was a move that separated academies from other state maintained schools to establish 
them as corporate entities with a direct relationship to central government.  
Consequently, a governing structure had to be established which had members (the 
equivalent to shareholders) and trustees (equivalent to directors) who are legally, but 
not financially, accountable for the operation of the academy.  Members act in a similar 
way to the shareholders of a company limited by shares and are invested with the power 
to change the name of the company or wind it up.  It is the role of trust members to 
endorse and safeguard the trust’s Memorandum of Association, to have an overview of 
the governance arrangements of the trust, to appoint other members and to add or 
remove trustees from the trust board.   Trustee is the name given to a member of the 
trust board (of directors) with responsibility for directing the trust’s affairs, for ensuring 
that it is solvent, well-run and delivering the trust’s charitable outcomes.  The trust thus 
serves as the legal entity of which the school is a part, with the trustees overseeing the 
running of the school and the option of delegating responsibility to any local governing 
body which they appoint.  The day-to-day management of the academy continued to be 
conducted by the headteacher and their senior management team, as expected under 
relevant legislation, and subject to inspection by the Office for Standards in Education 
(Ofsted, the national inspection service for schools in England). 
Commercial and business sponsors were not so forthcoming as the government had 
hoped, however, and the requirement was relaxed soon after 2006 following £1.3bn of 
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state funding having been spent with an average cost of £25m to set up each new 
academy.  This allowed more organisations to become involved in the running of 
academies, but without the overt financial commitment expected from previous sponsors 
of 10 per cent of the new academy’s capital costs.  The concept of ‘Sponsored 
Academies’ was dropped, with schools being described merely as ‘Academies’.  
 
The growth of academies 
Despite a concerted effort to promote this policy through three successive Labour 
governments, there were only 207 academies in England in 2010 at the time a new 
coalition government was elected.  The incoming Secretary of State for Education, 
Michael Gove, was determined to end the latent power of local authorities in relation to 
schools and sanctioned academisation as a fundamental principle of state-maintained 
schooling, with conversion now being open to any school deemed ‘outstanding’ by the 
national inspection scheme.  Such schools were to be called a ‘Converter Academy’.  
The Academies Act 2010 further allowed for the Secretary of State to require the 
academisation of any school that was deemed to be underperforming, for which 
subsequently there were schools which were forced to become academies often against 
the will of governors, parents and teachers (Elton & Male, 2015).   Such schools 
subsequently were to be known as a ‘Sponsored Academy’. 
 
Thus academies had become publicly funded independent schools which were only 
marginally linked to local authorities, normally through admission policies and special 
needs provision.  The atomisation of the state’s school system exhibited several high 
profile cases of financial impropriety, however, and public concerns about a disjointed, 
inequitable school system.    A study by Wilson (2018), for example, showed 76 Financial 
Notices to Improve had been issued to academy trusts from the Education and Skills 
Funding Agency (ESFA) by August of that year.  In addition, there were 16 ongoing 
investigations and 29 reviews of financial and governance in academy trusts at that time, 
with a further 201 letters to trusts issued by the DfE about poor or inadequate 
performance or weaknesses in safeguarding, governance or financial management 
(DfE, 2018a).  Concerns of these nature undoubtedly had contributed to the appointment 
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of eight Regional School Commissioners (RSCs) in 2014 who were charged with the 
responsibility to bring coherence to the rapid growth of the academies (see Figure 1).   
 
The focus of the RSCs work, overseen by a National Commissioner later appointed in 
2016, was thus to seek rationalisation of the academisation process.  As can be 
imagined this was a complex scenario with 628 academies being re-brokered into 
different trusts between 2013 and 2018 (Downs, 2018) and a large number of trusts 
having folded, closed or ceased operation since 2010 (Wilson, 2018: 7).  In a briefing 
note issued by the Department for Education it was stated that: 
 
RSCs, with the help of elected Headteacher Boards, will approve applications for 
new academies and free schools, approve and monitor sponsor capacity. They 
will also take intervention action where either performance [or governance] is 
poor. (cited in Durbin et al, 2015: 3) 
 
 
Figure 1 - The eight regions for school commissioners 
 
RSCs quickly adopted the stance that the process of academisation would be 
strengthened by the formal federation of individual academies into multi-academy trusts 
(MATs).  A MAT is formally led by one of the individual converter academies, typically 
the largest or most successful, and will run a central function for which costs are shared 
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across the trust.   Typically, Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) or equivalent, are 
appointed to take responsibility for day to day leadership across the MAT and are 
frequently also appointed as a trustee.   RSCs can then exert pressure on MATs to take 
on sponsor academies (i.e. those which are struggling or failing) as well as encourage 
other converter academies to join. 
 
The urgency to increase the number of academies was accelerated by a statement in 
the 2016 budget statement by the newly appointed Conservative government that all 
schools would be forced into becoming academies and by 2020 schools must have 
started or be already undergoing the conversion process, with the process to be 
complete by 2022.  At the time of that budget statement there were already 4515 
academies with 62 per cent of all secondary schools and just 15 per cent of all primary 
schools having made the transition.  The response was for many schools who had not 
previously considered academisation to act quickly and by July 2019 there was a total 
of 8728 academies in existence (75 per cent of secondary schools and, by now, 31 per 
cent of primary schools), with a further 687 in the process of conversion (DfE, 2019).  
The requirement to academise was subsequently dropped after the 2017 general 
election, but by that time the rapid expansion of academies was already evident, as was 
the growth of MATs and by July 2019 there were 1140 of between two and 20 academies 
(a total of 5714 schools) and only 45 of a larger size (a total of 2548 schools). 
 
Schemes of delegation within MATs 
In MATs the board of trustees is able to decide whether to appoint local governing bodies 
(LGBs) for individual schools within the trust, and which, if any, governance functions 
for which the LGBs would take responsibility (Wilkinson, 2017).  A scheme of delegation 
is a systematic way of ensuring that the members, trustees, board committees, local 
governing bodies, executive leadership and academy head teachers and heads of 
school are all clear about their roles and responsibilities.  Under these circumstances 
the LGB is actually a committee which the trust board has the power to appoint and 
remove at any time.   As head teachers and heads of school are line managed by the 
CEO, the LGB no longer carries out the governance function of holding the head teacher 
to account. 
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Research methods 
The research undertaken for this paper is drawn from interviews conducted during the 
calendar years of 2017-18 with the most senior executive available within 41 trusts to 
investigate how governance structures are being manifested in small to medium size 
MATs, which in this study are between two and 17 schools.    25 of the participants were 
women, mostly in the age range of 45-55, with all but one of them indicating their 
ethnicity as White-British.  The male participants had a similar profile, being exclusively 
White-British and typically in the same age range as the women.  Only two participants, 
both men, were under the age of 40.  The most common job title was Chief Executive 
Officer (31), with others named Executive Headteacher/Principal (6), Headteacher (2), 
Deputy CEO and a Principal Officer (who was interim CEO at the time of interview).  The 
majority (21) of the MATs were led by a designated Church of England academy (and 
thus corresponded to their Diocesan Board of Education as well as the RSC), whilst the 
remaining 20 were led by a community academy. The data presented in Table 1 are in 
date order of interview, with the first in January 2017 and the last completed in July 
2018.  Numbers of academies, members and trustees in the MAT were accurate at the 
time of the interview.  
 
Table 1- information on participating MATs 
Title Region Interview Gender Age Created Size  Designation Members Trustees 
CEO East Mids 20/01/2017 F 46-50 2013 13 Community 3 7 
Interim CEO South West 03/02/2017 F 46-50 2013 15 C of E 3 9 
Principal Officer South East 27/04/2017 F 51-55 2012 12 C of E 5 9 
Exec HT West Mids 03/05/2017 F 46-50 2012 12 C of E 7 8 
Exec HT West Mids 03/05/2017 M 36-40 2017 1 C of E 5 9 
CEO East Mids 04/05/2017 M 51-55 2014 9 C of E 4 8 
CEO South East 08/05/2017 M 46-50 2009 5 C of E 2 9 
CEO East Mids 17/05/2017 M 56+ 2015 17 Community 3 5 
CEO East Mids 17/05/2017 M 51-55 2012 7 Community 6 12 
CEO Lancs 22/05/2017 F 46-50 2016 9 Community 4 8 
CEO/HT East Mids 24/05/2017 F 51-55 2016 7 C of E 4 7 
CEO East 08/06/2017 F 51-55 2015 17 C of E 5 7 
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CEO East 08/06/2017 F n/a 2016 8 C of E 3 5 
CEO West Mids 08/06/2017 F 51-55 2013 11 C of E 4 9 
CEO West Mids 08/06/2017 M 51-55 2013 15 C of E 4 10 
CEO South East 15/06/2017 M 46-50 2015 5 Community 5 8 
HT South West 16/06/2017 F 51-55 2016 6 C of E 5 8 
Exec Principal South West 21/06/2017 M 51-55 2012 6 C of E 5 9 
CEO/Exec HT South West 21/06/2017 F 51-55 2017 15 Community 5 10 
CEO East Mids 22/06/2017 F 56+ 2014 7 Community 5 9 
CEO South West 23/06/2017 M n/a 2012 19 C of E 4 14 
CEO South West 26/06/2017 F 46-50 2015 4 Community 3 9 
CEO South West 29/06/2017 F 41-45 2016 8 Community 3 6 
Exec HT West Mids 03/10/2017 F 46-50 2014 7 Community 6 9 
CEO East Mids 11/10/2017 F 46-50 2016 5 Community 4 7 
Exec HT South Est 11/10/2017 F 46-50 2014 5 Community 5 10 
Exec Principal South East 20/10/2017 M 56+ 2013 2 Community 5 7 
CEO South East 03/11/2017 F 51-55 2015 3 Community 4 9 
CEO Lancs 15/03/2018 M 36-40 2014 4 C of E 5 9 
CEO Lancs 16/03/2018 F 41-45 2017 3 C of E 5 9 
CEO Lancs 16/03/2018 F 46-50 2016 3 C of E 4 12 
HT Lancs 16/03/2018 F 51-55 2017 3 C of E 5 9 
Deputy CEO South West 20/04/2018 F 51-55 2012 11 C of E 5 8 
CEO S Central 26/04/2018 F 46-50 2017 3 C of E 5 7 
CEO East Mids 02/05/2018 F 51-55 2013 14 C of E 4 9 
CEO South West 02/05/2018 M 56-60 2016 13 Community 3 12 
CEO South East 08/05/2018 F 56+ 2013 12 Community 4 11 
CEO North 15/06/2018 M 46-50 2011 4 Community 5 6 
CEO West Mids 22/06/2018 M 35-40 2016 2 Community 5 7 
CEO North 05/07/2018 M 46-50 2014 6 Community 5 9 
CEO North 05/07/2018 M 56+ 2016 5 Community 5 9 
 
Semi-structured interviews lasting between 45 and 90 minutes were conducted by one 
of a team of three researchers, led by the author, mainly through individual face-to-face 
meetings at the trust headquarters, with a few conducted via telephone.  Several areas 
were explored during these interviews, but only the theme of governance will be reported 
here.   
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Each interview was audio recorded (having agreed standard consent procedures) and 
subsequently transcribed by a professional service which was instructed to provide an 
edited version which removed repetition and hesitations.  Analysis of transcripts was 
undertaken by the author using an open coding technique which allowed for emergent 
themes in addition to a priori codes.  The data related to governance were further 
subjected to analysis, using textual review, to seek patterns and/or dissimilarities. 
 
Findings 
The three key elements of governance within MATs are the members, trustees and 
schemes of delegation to local governing bodies.   
 
Members: There is a requirement for MATs to have a minimum of three members, 
although the DfE recommends five.  As can be deduced from Table 1, the average 
number of members in this sample was four per trust.  Further research is needed in 
this dimension, but at this stage it was noted from a preliminary review of several annual 
reports from trusts there appears to be a relatively high turnover of members.  Clearly, 
more systematic examination of such data will be required, but it seems that in the early 
stages of establishing some academies too little thought was given to the role of a 
member.  One typical response from the interviews came from a female CEO from the 
Lancashire and West Yorkshire Region who reported having members who had grown 
from being governors of an individual school, but had become “a bit time-expired”.  A 
further issue was noted in CofE MATs who typically reported a strong diocesan 
presence in the members, typically involving the bishop and others from the Diocesan 
Board of Education.  
 
Trustees: A similar pattern of turnover of trustees was evident, with a deliberate pattern 
of upskilling.  This was perhaps most graphically demonstrated by a female CEO in the 
East Midlands and Humber Region who stated “we started off with about five very lovely 
numpties, but we’ve now got a really good skillset”.  It was relatively common for 
participants to highlight a transitional stage whereby members of school governing 
bodies (usually the chair) became a trustee, but this pattern was typically being phased 
out as illustrated by a male CEO in the North region in describing how he was seeking 
13 
 
13 
 
to set up local governing bodies “with a director in there because our model isn’t to bring 
LGB chairs onto the board every time”.  A different male CEO from the same region 
summed up the move towards upskilling the board of trustees: 
 
We did a skills gap of what was needed and through mutual intelligences we 
sourced people at the skills that we needed. 
 
This process of “head-hunting” (female CEO- West Midlands Region) for trustees who 
matched the needs of a growing MAT was also matched by a determination to 
professionalise the board.  The following description from a male CEO of a community 
led MAT in the East Midlands and Humber Region, which included C of E schools, 
summarises the typical pattern of board development: 
 
We completely went away from a representative model so now everybody on the 
board is there because they've got a skills base or because they have a diocese 
perspective to look after the church schools. I am there as a CEO in a standing 
position. […] We're planning that nobody will represent the local governors and 
everybody has to be just a trustee. We've said to people, because there are two 
colleagues that still are governors, by the end of this academic year, you're either 
in the local governing body or you're on the trust board. We’d had one or two 
incidents where people would start to fight the corner for individual schools within 
the trust and we said that that can't happen. If you're a trustee, you've got to have 
the big picture. 
 
As can be seen from Table 1, the number of trustees across this sample of MATs ranged 
from five to 14, with an average of nine on the board.  The same evidence taken from 
the annual reports, as used above when exploring members, indicate a relatively high 
turnover of trustees.  In two of the MATs in this sample, one from the South West Region 
and one from the South East and South London Region, there had been a breakdown 
of the boards with trustees resigning, apparently not having understood the implications 
of their role.  Consequently, the two CEOs involved had entered their role to find virtual 
chaos in the governance proceedings.  Fortunately, it seems the majority of MATs in 
this sample have moved beyond such scenarios and often have used the Academy 
Ambassador Scheme, a not-for profit programme funded by the DfE which helps MATs 
to recruit high-calibre business candidates with skills in areas such as finance, law, 
audit, risk, change and growth management (Academy Abassadors, n.d.).  This, says a 
male CEO from the North Region allows him to recruit “more like a modern trust board”. 
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Local governing bodies: Polar views were exhibited towards the suitability of individual 
governing bodies for each school within the MAT.  Two participants indicated, for 
example, that they saw no benefit accruing from the continuation of individual governing 
bodies and referred to them in one instance as a “nuisance” and in another as an entity 
they would disband, given the chance. 
 
I don't want to be a trust that gets rid of them because they're a nuisance, but 
they are a nuisance. (female CEO – East Midlands and Humber Region) 
 
If I had it my way again, I would have disbanded all local governing bodies. (male 
CEO – North Region) 
 
Others were more reticent, however, recognising that some governing bodies have yet 
to realise they are no longer in the same legal position as before becoming a trust.  This 
was most evident in converter academies, especially where virtually the same 
membership of previous governing body was sustained in the new trust.  Entry to the 
MAT seemingly often resulted in a period of dawning realisation for such academy 
boards which, on occasion was met by resistance, incomprehension and resentment.  
Typical of such a scenario was the situation experienced when two successful 
standalone academies joined together: 
 
The first six months was really about pulling together a proper working scheme 
of delegation.  During that period, the local governing body [of the converter 
academy] suddenly realised that they’d just given away most of their power to the 
trust board.  There was a bit of a tussle between the chairs, even though they 
were actually attending the trust board, in terms of working out where the 
responsibilities lay. […] When you’re encouraging schools to come in, you’re 
effectively saying to the people that will make the decision “you’re going to have 
less power”.  Unless they really buy into why MATs are successful that can 
sometimes be a difficult conversation.  (female CEO – South East England and 
South London Region) 
 
The transition was seen to be easier with sponsor academies, with trusts frequently 
finding less resistance from schools that had been in Ofsted categories of ‘special 
measures’ or ‘requiring improvement’.  In two instances, individual school governing 
bodies had been replaced by interim boards in much the same way as when a local 
authority or the RSC appoints an Interim Executive Board (IEB) where an existing 
governing board has been deemed ineffective (DfE, 2018c). 
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Normal practice, however, was for LGBs (councils, committees or advisory boards in 
some instances) to be established at individual school level and for these to be designed 
to maintain a focus on student performance and to work with the head of the school to 
sustain improvement in learning and teaching.  It was also common for there to be fewer 
‘governors’ than required by previous legislation.  Of the participants investigated in this 
investigation the majority (28) indicated their trust had retained the title of ‘Local 
Governing Board’, even where such a denomination disguised a typical pattern of 
delegation which recognised the MAT was the accountable body, as graphically 
described by one CEO: 
 
One of the greatest things that we’ve decided to do, is not to have local governing 
bodies.  Fundamentally, it’s disingenuous because the governance of the trust 
sits with the board of directors.  (male CEO – East Midlands & Humber Region). 
 
Senior officers from another seven MATs indicated they already had renamed their 
previous governing bodies to become ‘Local Governing Committees’ and four naming 
them ‘Local Advisory Boards’, with two CEOs describing how such boards were working 
across regional hubs within the MAT.  Only two participants did not provide sufficient 
information to allow for the naming of their local school governance structures.  The 
pattern was clear, however, in that previous governing bodies typically had been more 
or less stripped of decision making and were now operating in closely managed 
schemes of delegation. 
 
I love them all, but one, they’re a huge barrier, and two, why are we asking 
volunteers to do this? It’s nonsense. Because governor recruitment is incredibly 
difficult, and I’m not surprised because it’s a ridiculous job. So, we’re not 
abolishing them, we’re changing their purpose […]  We’re going to call them local 
academy councils, and they will do the stuff that we can’t do from the centre, all 
the stuff governors used to do. (female CEO – East Midlands and Humber 
Region) 
 
Limitations 
The 41 senior executives were all participants in a series of team leadership 
development programmes for small to medium size MATs in England which ran from 
November, 2016 until July 2018.   There had been three cohorts engaged in a 9-month 
integrated programme which combined three residential modules, supplemented by 
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facilitated regional learning sets, a range of practical tasks and assignments and the 
opportunity for participants to engage in online and self-directed learning through use of 
a dedicated VLE site.  Although it could be argued this was a representative sample, it 
needs to be borne in mind all participants were volunteers seeking to improve the 
structure and operating capacity of their MAT. 
 
As can be seen from Table 1 just over half of the sample MATs (21) are aligned to the 
Church of England (C of E) through their lead academy (although many included 
community converter and sponsored academies), a relationship which carries with it 
expectations and a degree of control over the ethos these MATs.   The Church of 
England was pioneer in establishing schools in England, particularly for children of the 
poor, and has a memorandum of understanding with the DfE which stipulates that the 
diocese owns its schools and has the first opportunity to show it is capable of providing 
a solution if a school is struggling.  With 250 sponsored and over 650 converter 
academies, the Church is the biggest sponsor of academies in England (Church of 
England, 2017). 
 
In some ways, therefore, the sample can be deemed to be representative of small-to 
medium size MATs in England, although with the provisos that the participants had 
similar motivation to enhance their trust and there were many factors pertaining to the 
church which perhaps affect views offered in this research. 
 
Discussion 
From this sample it can be demonstrated that there is no such thing as a typical MAT, 
with the only congruent feature being they are all charitable trusts who have an Academy 
Agreement with the DfE.    What typically was witnessed here was 41 MATs seeking to 
scale up from their current size, mostly small (i.e. 2 to 5 academies), to medium size 
(15-30).  As a consequence of loose management of academies between 2010 and 
2017, when this research started, many different types of trusts have emerged with 
different features, purposes and intent. Hill (2015) identified three classifications: 
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 Long-established MATs that have chosen to grow at a slower more sustainable, 
rate; 
 Newer academy groups which in some instances have grown quite quickly as 
groups of schools have converted together and in other cases the relatively rapid 
growth reflects the entrepreneurial nature of the MAT Board or CEO; and  
 Diocesan Trusts which probably represents the largest and fastest growth in the 
MAT sector.   
   
Whilst this classification does help, it is not exhaustive and there is a need to 
acknowledge that the government desire to rapidly expand the academies, even in 2016 
to declare an intent for all schools to academise, created a number of anomalies.  As 
illustrated above, within this sample there was evidence of idiosyncrasy with the attempt 
to formulate a MAT which combined independent and state maintained schools with a 
huge geographic footprint.  There was also evidence of what Hill refers to as ‘manic 
MATs’, where groups of schools rushed “to huddle together because they are frightened 
of being ‘done to’ or taken over by a ‘predatory’ MAT” (Hill, 2016).  One stark example 
from the South West Region saw the incoming CEO having to cope with schools where 
the governing bodies seemingly were oblivious to their membership of the MAT and with 
a trust board that had not realised the level of accountability to which they had committed 
when setting up the company.  The original decision to establish the trust was clearly a 
defensive move, designed to ensure diocesan bodies retained control.   The 
development of some CofE MATs could also be considered to fall into that category, 
although more frequently the religious ideal was a greater factor.  In this sample, two 
MATs (one from the East Region and one from the East Midlands Region) were 
deliberately established, ostensibly to ensure adherence to the faith, but also with the 
concern to protect church property and land.  When a school becomes an academy the 
trust subsequently owns the land and buildings on which the school(s) are placed; the 
Church of England is the biggest such land owner.  Groupings of academies are also 
subject to apocryphal tales of ‘mates’ MATs, where one of the major reasons to join 
together is to avoid unwanted attention from Ofsted or RSCs.  It would be a harsh 
judgement to label any MAT within this sample in such a way, but in two instances (both 
in the South East and South London Region) there was evidence of MATs being formed 
for economies of scale.  
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The ‘looseness’ in regard to the academisation process alluded to above refers both to 
the political desire to free schools from local authority control, manifested in the 
sanctioning of academies on a large-scale together with the emergence of Free Schools 
and University Technical Colleges (UTCs) following the Academies Act 2010, and 
inadequate regulations.  In turn, this led to several high-profile cases of either financial 
concerns or the politicisation of schooling.  Fuller details of financial concerns are 
addressed more fully below, but the possibility of politicisation was illustrated graphically 
in the ‘Trojan Horse’ case in Birmingham where it was alleged that for many schools, 
including some academies, there had been a concerted effort to take over governing 
bodies by those interested in promoting Islam in the curriculum.  The final report on the 
subject, ordered by the House of Commons, concluded that was actually the case. 
 
There has been co-ordinated, deliberate and sustained action, carried out by a 
number of associated individuals, to introduce an intolerant and aggressive 
Islamic ethos into a few schools in Birmingham.  (Clarke, 2014: 14)  
 
Whilst controversy was evident about this case, it is illustrative of the vulnerability of the 
governance structures which became more obvious when examining reports from the 
ESFA concerning governance and financial management.  As shown by Wilson (2018), 
a large number of cases of notices to improve and ongoing investigations demonstrated 
laxity which could be exploited and often was.  Partly this seemed related to previous 
Articles of Association which allowed trust employees to be members, whereas the 
current articles do not (ESFA, 2018a: 19).  A substantial number of the Financial Notices 
to Improve, reviews and investigations related to academy trusts in which employees 
and/or directors of companies were allowed to act as both members and trustees, as 
was the case under the early model Articles of Association (Wilson, 2018: 44).  In one 
instance, in a single academy trust, the ESFA investigation reported that no interests 
had been declared despite a trustee being the brother of the principal and a series of 
other familial ties between trustees, staff members and members of academy governing 
body (Wilson, 2018).  In another financial management and governance review the 
ESFA described a trust in which the headteacher and school business manager were 
the founding members.  Furthermore, the headteacher was also a trustee and the 
business manager acted as clerk to the board, whilst both were trust employees.  Finally, 
the headteacher and business manager were the sole signatories at the bank and users 
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of the electronic banking system.  The business manager was absent from work during 
the review, after which the headteacher was suspended.  There were multiple other 
similar cases. 
 
The amendment to the Articles of Association (ESFA, 2018a) has clearly limited the 
opportunity for such anomalies to exist, as has been the requirement for fully audited 
accounts to be filed annually.  Nevertheless, 88 trusts were late on more than two 
occasions filing financial returns during financial year 2017-18 (ESFA, 2018b).  It seems 
there is still too many opportunities and too few accountability measures to stop further 
governance and financial management irregularities, as can be seen within two 
documentaries aired on BBC TV in 2018 & 2019 which not only presented detailed 
evidence from the schools, but also showed how the DfE had been unable to control 
such actions (BBC Panorama, 2018 & 2019). 
 
Conclusions 
Fortunately, the 41 MATs investigated in this research did not resemble any of the 
features relating to governance and financial management illustrated in ESFA or BBC 
investigations.  The vast majority were in steady growth mode and corresponding to 
RSC and DfE expectations.  The core feature, however, was the removal of individual 
governing boards and their replacement, in most instances, with schemes of delegation 
to local governing bodies or councils, either within each school or for a regional hub.  
There was also evidence of trustees being independent and drawn from different sectors 
of the community, different backgrounds, different roles and professions in an attempt 
to upskill the board of directors.  No such clarity was seen around members and there 
is more work to be undertaken in this regard. 
 
In terms of their size all but a few of the MATs investigated here were corresponding to 
the government advice to avoid incongruous geographic footprints:   
 
In its early enthusiasm for MATs, the Government encouraged trusts to expand 
too quickly over too large geographical regions. Schools which operate within 
close proximity to one another are best able to share resources and expertise 
and subsequently can most successfully take advantage of being part of a MAT. 
(House of Commons Education Committee, 2017: 17) 
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The stress has been on MATs having a coherent ambition to expand, “in coherent 
geographical clusters with a shared sense of community, ethos and values, with most 
“most trusts [thinking] no more than one hour’s driving time between schools in a cluster 
was about right” (DfE, 2016: 12).  This was the most common pattern seen in this 
investigation and where there were differences it was either due to the type of provision 
(such as the MAT focusing on alternative provision) or because the MAT had 
established regional hubs. 
 
The most alarming conclusion does not emerge from the data, however, but from 
analysis of the laxity of regulation and control that has been witnessed by the ESFA and 
demonstrated graphically through the BBC documentaries.  The legitimacy of school 
governance pertaining to academy trusts seems more reliant on leaps of faith from 
government rather than effective accountability measures.  Whilst none of the 41 MATs 
in this investigation were involved in illegal or immoral practice, the potential for this was 
always evident.  Currently, for example, there is substantial debate around the alleged 
practice of ‘off-rolling’ (the process of removing difficult or challenging pupils from 
schools) by some MATs which has already resulted in both Ofsted (Bradbury, 2018) and 
the House of Commons Education Committee (2018) exhibiting concern.  As discussed 
above the core purpose of school governance is to ensure legitimacy of action and intent 
and yet the move to academisation has increased the possibility of illegal and immoral 
behaviour by trust boards.  Fortunately, none of this was evident in this investigation. 
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